“To conjure or add something out of that brief ‘second portion’, which had not been provided for, would tantamount to importing certain ingredients that were not envisaged by Parliament. In fact under sub-r 1(1) of O 10, nothing is indicated that the plaintiff must evidentially prove that the named person in the writ must be the very person who had received it, ie if it was sent by prepaid AR registered post. It therefore was satisfied that as in this case, if all the prerequisites were fulfilled, as the plaintiff had done so, the recipient being ‘Yanti’ did not vitiate that service. In fact, whether that writ had physically arrived, or had been received at the last known address, normally confirmed by direct evidence, is not even legislated into that impugned provision. On that score, if the plaintiff had direct and cogent evidence of that writ having been received by the intended person, that was a plus factor for the former, otherwise s 12 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 would immediately come into play when invoked. Under the latter section, where a written law authorizes postal service, then until the contrary is proved, service shall be presumed to have been effected at the time when the letter would have been delivered, in the ordinary course of the post. Therefore, unless rebutted by the defendants, service thus must be deemed to have taken place. As it were, I found no rebuttal evidence before me.”
Pengkalen Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Chow Mooi & Anor [2003] 3 MLJ 67
Pengkalen Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Chow Mooi & Anor [2003] 3 MLJ 67
